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The “Second Circulation” of the 1970s and 1980s as a  
Component of a Social Movement: Applying Social  
Movement Theory to the Analysis of the Polish Opposition
Adam Mielczarek
Two parallel traditions are continuously present in theories of social move-
ments developed since the early 1970s. The first of them emerged among 
American scholars and reflects their experiences; it is a theory of resource mo-
bilization that puts a strong emphasis on the rational character of the activities 
of leading players who have some institutional affiliation, and the political 
character of the challenges. This theory describes the development of social 
movements from the perspective of managers who are conscious of their goals, 
and who have at their disposal certain material and nonmaterial resources and 
skillfully use them to acquire broad support for collective action.1 The second 
tradition developed primarily in Europe and was principally a reaction to the 
experiences of European counterculture movements; it emerged from a rela-
tively diverse array of theories called the new social movement theories. This 
tradition places a strong emphasis on the cultural background and identities 
of individuals involved in a movement, and notices that movements emerging 
in modern societies usually concentrate on specific nonmaterialistic (or post-
materialistic) values such as social participation, self-governance, or auton-
omy.2 However, many authors maintain that despite many differences these 
traditions can be treated not as alternatives, but rather as complementary ap-
 This is a revised version of a paper written for the research project No. 2013/08/S/
HS6/00199 funded by the National Science Centre. The paper was presented at the 
conference “Drugi obieg wydawniczy w PRL na tle historii samizdatu w państwach 
bloku sowieckiego po 1956 roku” (The second circulation in the People’s Poland and 
the history of samizdat in Soviet Bloc countries after 1956) at IPN in Warsaw, May 31 
to June 1, 2012; a volume of conference proceedings is forthcoming.
1 Steven M. Buechler, “Beyond Resource Mobilization? Emerging Trends in Social 
Movement Theory,” The Sociological Quarterly 34, no. 2 (1993): 217–35.
2 Steven M. Buechler, “New Social Movement Theories,” The Sociological Quarterly 36, 
3 (1995): 441–64.
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proaches that augment one another.3 In my view the Polish experience of Soli-
darność and in general the anticommunist movement of the 1970s and 1980s 
supports this latter view as it demonstrates that depending on the structure of 
political opportunities, the dynamics of the development of the Polish oppo-
sition followed one or the other logics of action described in these traditions.4
This applies as well to publishing, a very important part of the opposition 
movements of 1970s and 1980s. The history of publishing is a good illustration 
of the complicated mechanisms governing these movements. Contrary to the 
apparently obvious interpretation, the Polish “independent publishing move-
ment” or “underground printing infrastructure” cannot be seen as a simple 
asset at the disposal of the leadership, utilized as a medium for articulating 
their objectives and communicating with followers. If the publishing move-
ment sometimes fulfilled these utilitarian functions, it was by no means a com-
placent tool in the hands of the movement’s strategists. First of all, it was not 
a uniform entity that could be ordered to do this or that; it was rather a form 
of activity by many people willing to get involved. This form had its own dy-
namism with a significant impact on the functioning of the opposition as the 
whole.
The Development of the Repertoires of Contention
The independent publishing movement should be considered above all as an 
important element in the opposition’s repertoires of contention. In the initial 
period during the mid-1970s the array of means available to potential Polish 
dissidents to press their demands was ill-defined.5 In many circles discontent 
with the existing system of power persisted and grew, but all forms of resis-
tance and dissent seemed ineffective. Still, a catalogue of imaginable opposi-
tion activities existed. It was culturally determined by the traditions inherited 
from the dissident experiences of the past, both recent and from the times 
3 Bert Klandermans and Sidney G. Tarrow, “Mobilization into Social Movements: 
Synthesizing the European and the American Approach,” in From Structure to Action: 
Comparing Social Movement Research Across Cultures, ed. Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter 
Kriesi, and Sydney G. Tarrow (Greenwich, CT: JAI-Press, 1988). 
4 Adam Mielczarek, ”Ruch Solidarności w świetle teorii ruchów społecznych,” in 
Kultura solidarności: Socjologiczno-antropologiczne analizy kulturowego dziedzictwa Solidar-
ności, ed. Karolina Ciechorska-Kulesza, Radosław Kossakowski, and Paweł Łuczeczko 
(Gdańsk: Orbis Exterior, 2011).
5 The definition of repertoires of contention by Charles Tilly, as quoted in Donatella 
della Porta and Mario Diani, Social Movements: An Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1999).
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of the Polish partitions.6 This catalog consisted of both techniques employed 
earlier and innovative behaviors that could be reconciled with the opposition 
values of the time.
Undertaking a particular form of activity was probably a matter of choice 
by an individual, but also his or her rational calculation about the activity’s 
appeal and effectiveness—and also personal safety, as this factor seems to me 
to be an important variable. The pioneers of dissident activities can be seen as 
explorers performing difficult experiments with their own lives and freedom 
at stake. Initially the repertoire probably included both violent and nonviolent 
activities, but the power assessment seemed to tip towards the latter.
The experimenters included members of the future dissident elite as well 
as various opponents of the system today largely forgotten, such as the Kowal-
czyk brothers or many members of Ruch.7 Their activities included “hallway 
sitting” at political trials, signing petitions and open letters, writing antigov-
ernment slogans on walls, and ordering patriotic masses and celebrations.8 
Nobody yet was at the head of the forming opposition, nobody energized 
it—it can be said that each and every participant tried to fight the system by 
himself and walked an unbeaten path.
The emergence of leaders, people who drew the attention of other poten-
tial dissidents, was a consequence of these pioneers’ success. It was a result 
of their actions that fell onto fertile ground and appropriately responded to a 
given political opportunity structure. As it turned out, these actions were rel-
atively effective and safe ways and means of displaying one’s discontent, and 
they seemed to offer the prospect of developing a dissident community. Thus 
emerging leaders gained some ability to direct the others interested in work-
6 See Ann Swidler, “Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies,” American Sociological 
Review 51, no. 2 (1986): 273–86.
7 In 1971 brothers Ryszard and Jerzy Kowalczyk planted a bomb at the Opole Uni-
versity to protest against repressions against workers. The bomb exploded but there 
were no casualties. The perpetrators were captured and sentenced: Ryszard to death, 
and Jerzy to 25 years in prison; as a result of the protests of leading Polish intellectuals 
against the severity of the punishment, Ryszard’s sentence was commuted to 25 years. 
Ruch (the Movement) was the largest underground organization in post-Stalinist Po-
land aiming at making Poland a democratic country. It was active from mid-1965 to 
1970; at its peak it counted ca. 100 members. In 1970 the organization was apprehended 
by the security on the eve of its planned destruction of the Lenin Museum in the Tatra 
Mountains. During the ensuing trial the Ruch leaders were sentenced from four to 
seven years in prison. 
8 Political trials were theoretically open to the public, but often the audience was 
filled with SB agents, hence the practice of sitting in the hallway in front of the court-
room to express solidarity with those on trial.
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ing with them. This does not change the fact that every time the effectiveness 
of their inspiration depended on how each individual participant assessed his 
or her potential gains or losses resulting from the activity. Joining a group that 
had some achievements and was associated with a person with a recognizable 
name was attractive—it opened possibilities of collaboration with others and 
development of a shared dissident identity. Yet it was not a kind of appeal that 
could prompt potential participants to engage in activities outside of what 
they themselves considered appropriate and potentially successful.
I believe this also applies to the genesis and development of the publishing 
movement in Poland. Printing was one of the activities considered possible by 
different actors at that time. As we know not all of them were ready to use it. 
Andrzej Friszke wrote about the concerns among the KOR members about 
crossing the border of “the illegal” by using duplicators; this likely resulted 
in the fact that the first KOR publications were published like samizdat.9 But 
among the dissidents there were also people of a different opinion, ready to 
take a risk, and their experimentation proved effective. Janusz Krupski’s du-
plicator that Jacek Kuroń was afraid to use was eventually put to work with-
out triggering the expected repressions. This prompted the inclusion of this 
form of activity in the repertoire of contention of the entire opposition, and 
subsequently had an impact on the range of activities of all dissident leaders 
and the resources at their disposal. But it was the coincidence of a rational 
political decision by a manager of a movement and a grassroots dynamics 
independent of his will that made this decision possible.
The Resource and the Autonomous Power
Among the ideas advanced by one of the best known theoreticians of new 
social movements, Alberto Melucci, there is a proposition to break with the 
notion of social movements as uniform entities expressing the presumed com-
mon goals of communities united around these goals. Melucci stresses that the 
unity often attributed to a movement is a theoretical abstraction which does 
not reflect reality. In reality, individuals are driving forces behind actions; 
they define the conditions of their collaboration during these actions through 
interactions and agreements.10 The beginnings of the Polish opposition of the 
9 Andrzej Friszke, ”Biuletyn Informacyjny KOR (1976–1980),” in Solidarność podziemna 
1981—1989, ed. Andrzej Friszke, (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2006). See also Andrzej Friszke, 
Czas KOR-u: Jacek Kuroń a geneza Solidarności (Cracow: Znak; ISP PAN, 2011).
10 Alberto Melucci, The Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in 
Contemporary Society (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989).
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1970s illustrate this opinion well. The ideas to create some form of opposi-
tion dawned in many heads, groups, and salons, and the climate of relative 
tolerance that developed during the rule of Edward Gierek’s regime was con-
ducive to bringing these ideas gradually into the open and forging contacts 
between their proponents. Even if some members of the opposition elites from 
past historical events were present in the emerging movement, it was largely 
amorphous, and it was not predetermined who would join forces with whom. 
The movement’s political profile was shaped in salon debates, and only later 
emerging local activists were to face difficult choices as to whether they were 
closer to KOR or ROPCiO, and if the latter, aligned to which faction.
But with the passage of time the movement was gradually forging its orga-
nizers. Jacek Kuroń’s writings testify to the fact that at least some of the emerg-
ing leaders referred to the notion of a social movement and thought about its 
effective employment as a tool to exercise political pressure and achieve polit-
ical goals. Kuroń thought of giving the budding social movements direction 
and mobilizing them, and imagined them as a grass-roots power that could 
become a base for political actions of the opposition leaders. He advocated the 
emergence of “the Poland of social movements”—which largely came true.
Many activities undertaken by KOR or other ideological hubs of the oppo-
sition had a character typical for the workings of political managers trying to 
mobilize social movements. This entailed them treating publishing initiatives 
as a “conveyor belt” to the wide audience: a tool to enlighten and activate 
communities important to these leaders. Such was the character of many pub-
lications conceived as more or less official organs of the movement, or the jour-
nals aiming at the activation of particular social groups or circles, like Robotnik, 
for instance. On the other hand, almost from the beginning the publishing 
movement developed autonomy. Authors, editors, and printers did not want 
to be treated as mere tools. Very soon they started to use freedom of speech 
according to their liking and to print whatever they deemed appropriate. They 
did not always follow the words of political leaders because they did not en-
tirely feel like their underlings. 
Independent publishers, though, usually had some identifiable affilia-
tion within the political spectrum of the Polish opposition, but were for the 
most part recognized as autonomous players. Political leaders could be sure 
that the published texts would fully conform to their views only if they wrote 
them themselves. More importantly, in the intelligentsia circles where the op-
position developed, texts intended for these circles’ internal consumption in-
stantly appeared—the best example of this phenomenon is Zapis. Independent 
publishing from its very beginning displayed a propensity to become “nor-
mal”—a market for the literature that interested the publishers themselves, 
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and a place to exchange ideas between the participants. The publishing part 
of the opposition got involved in serving the political ends of the opposition 
leaders, but for the most part it was conscious of its organizational separate-
ness and autonomy.11 This sense was reinforced by the antipolitical ideology 
prevalent in the 1970s among the largest part of independent publishing con-
nected with KOR.12 According to this ideology, creating institutions like the 
free press was not a tool in the struggle for freedom, but an objective itself.
The Interlude 
After August 1980 the independent publishing movement changed its charac-
ter, as did the entire opposition. The existing independent publishing houses 
to some degree disappeared in the large gray sphere of union publications 
(printed in compliance with the existing law “for internal union use only”). 
Some independent publishers transferred their resources to Solidarność, while 
others chose to remain underground. Due to the accessibility of uncensored 
printed matter, the activity of dissident publishers seemed to have temporar-
ily lost the unique identity it had had before and was to restore later. Pub-
lishing houses had a similar independence and similar relation to the rest of 
the Solidarność movement as its other participants. When grand politics was 
played elsewhere, they left the limelight.
Yet publishers remained an extremely important factor in the dynamics 
of the movement as a tool for breaking information taboos established by the 
authorities. The particular informal status of publishers permitted them to be 
the gauges of truly free speech, while at the same time setting the standards 
of free speech within the revolution as it was happening. If we agree that the 
change brought by that revolution was primarily about the great cognitive 
freedom experienced by nearly all participants of these events, then the pub-
lishing movement played an enormous role in that change.
That extraordinary period of freedom had a momentous impact on both 
the existing operating conditions of the opposition and its resources for the 
future, i.e., the coming martial law. The order hitherto deemed unchangeable 
turned out to be possible to modify, and almost all the workforce in Poland be-
came members of Solidarność, an organization openly incompatible with real 
11 This character is captured in the description of the publishers in the 1970s by Jan 
Józef Lipski in KOR: Komitet Obrony Robotników—Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej (War-
saw: IPN, 2006), 274-78.
12 Compare David Ost, Solidarity and the Politics of Anti-Politics: Opposition and Reform 
in Poland since 1968 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990).
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socialism. The symbols of the opposition became instantly recognizable, and 
participation in its culture became common. A prevailing part of the society 
supported the opposition and felt this in their everyday activities.
The technical base of the publishing movement considerably increased. 
Solidarność brought in hundreds of printing machines, some of which would 
avoid confiscation under martial law. At the same time the publishing cadre—
trained printers or people familiar with the publication process—grew expo-
nentially because of the unrestricted production of internal Solidarność publi-
cations. In addition, virtually every literate Pole became a potential reader of 
independent publications.
All Over Again
The skillfully executed coup of December 13, 1981 left the great and awak-
ened social movement leaderless and without structure. As the union formula 
domi nant during the previous 16 months collapsed, a pool of potential op-
position activists much larger than before August 1980 faced the necessity 
to develop a new repertoire of contention, appropriate for the dramatically 
changed situation.
The dissidents largely found themselves in the situation of “starting all 
over again,” beating unknown paths, and testing possibilities that carried un-
known repercussions. In the new circumstances it was hard to predict which 
actions would be effective and what would be the reaction of the authorities. 
The pre-martial law leaders initiated such discussion but they had no brilliant 
ideas how to solve the new problems of the opposition. The behavior of rank-
and-file activists that started to manifest itself independently of declarations 
of the political leaders was of greater consequence.
The people who wanted to defend Solidarność at first resorted to activi-
ties that had already been tried: strikes, community support, impromptu shar-
ing of information, and various symbolic gestures such as wearing mourning 
clothes or electrical resistors, lighting candles, and taking ostentatious walks 
outside during the official nightly TV news. All of these expressed the society’s 
anger and opposition towards the authorities. These activities emerged spon-
taneously on the basis of individual decisions and calculations of gains and 
losses, and they were based on historically determined patterns of behavior.
The movement intuitively resorted to various examples including those 
from distant historical epochs (especially the 1863 January Insurrection). But 
more often these were recent models. This was possible because Solidarność 
created its distinct tradition, and the new repertoire of contention, adjusted 
to the conditions of martial law, was to be built from it. The features of this 
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tradition based on the movement’s self-perception as strong, popular, and en-
dowed with moral right that sooner or later will bring the enemy to its knees. 
This self-image determined the general principles: the focus on “society” and 
the concern with societal support, the emphasis on information and symbolic 
actions, as well as renouncing violence. These principles shaped the activities 
during the first months of martial law.
In contrast, there were certain resources for which the movement could 
reach. They comprised the earlier experiences of the independent publishing 
movement. They included people with certain skills, preserved equipment 
and materials, as well as the public accustomed to independent publications 
and naturally linking the tradition of Solidarność with printed, uncensored 
words. The movement also had access to other resources such as, for instance, 
the infrastructure of the Catholic Church that was supportive of Solidarność, 
and which during the entire seven years between 1982 and 1989 served as a 
home for various cultural initiatives of the opposition, including those sup-
porting independent publishing.
Finally, the third important factor was the limited choice of political pos-
sibilities when certain forms of protest seemed too risky. In conditions of open 
terror, clandestine publishing might appear as a reasonable compromise be-
tween the desire to openly resist the authorities and the care for one’s own 
safety. However, I must stress that this was not the only possible compromise, 
and many activists chose to engage in other activities.
Commencing activities necessarily entailed the emergence of leaders, peo-
ple capable of connecting separate resources and coordinating the group. In 
conditions of an energized social movement with a rich reservoir of potential 
activists but communication limited by martial law, leaders emerged at the 
local level.13 This was natural at a time when the countrywide Solidarność and 
opposition leaders were in prison. In the first weeks and months of martial law 
many on the local level spontaneously created groups and explored possible 
forms of activity. The most effective of these groups survived, the ones that, on 
13 A spontaneous individual initiative was the best recommendation to get accepted 
into a larger entity. This is how in 1983 Bogdan Borusewicz described recruitment to 
the underground. “If someone wants to be active, he gets on with it and doesn’t run 
after money […] If someone tells me that he’ll do some printing, but only after he gets 
a new printing machine from the West, original stencils, and at least 50,000 zlotys 
to start, then I give him nothing, absolutely nothing […] It’s a different story when a 
person comes with some talent, who’s competent organizationally (because he can get 
paper), intellectually (because he can write), and physically reliable (because he can 
manage to roll stencils for hours). This kind of person will always get help.” In Maciej 
Łopiński, Marcin Moskit [pseud.], and Mariusz Wilk, Konspira: Solidarity Underground 
(Berkeley: University of California Press), 145–46.
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the one hand, met their members’ expressive needs and, on the other, proved 
resistant to the repressive environment of martial law. Their evolution natu-
rally took the direction of merging smaller initiatives into bigger and better- 
equipped ones while at the same time preserving the diversity reflecting both 
different opinions and characters of the individual activists.
Even if the movement was at a higher stage of development than a few 
years before, the process of creating its repertoire of contention had to a cer-
tain extent repeat itself in order to adapt to the new circumstances. Only some 
forms of activity survived that evolution, including publishing, which became 
almost a synonym for underground Solidarność. The publishing movement 
fit easily into existing traditions, was effective because of its previous experi-
ence, and the level of danger of imprisonment or repressions by the authori-
ties turned out to be acceptable to the participants.
Underground Managers
Although the evolution of underground Solidarność after December 13, 1981 
was in my opinion primarily a grass-roots process, we should not overlook the 
Solidarność politicians who tried to play the role of managers of a social move-
ment. But I do not think their role was great. Most of them found themselves 
in internment camps without influence on what was happening outside. Also, 
those who remained at large initially had limited possibilities to determine 
whether and how the resistance was developing.
At the end of March 1982 the Warsaw leaders (Jacek Kuroń, Zbigniew 
Bujak, Wiktor Kulerski, and Adam Michnik) discussed the methods of under-
ground activities in Tygodnik Mazowsze. The declaration “Underground Soci-
ety” summarizing this initial stage of programmatic discussion was published 
in July 1982.14 Understandably the creation of any central underground struc-
ture amidst repression and persecution took some time. But in the meantime 
the spirit of resistance among the broad masses of activists was so strong that 
they moved significantly ahead of the movement’s political representation. 
Thus that discussion took place when underground Solidarność was already a 
fact and a social practice. The leaders were not showing the ways but endors-
ing the solutions that had already proven themselves.
Moreover, neither that exchange nor the later initiatives of the under-
ground political leaders (whether those close to the TKK Solidarność or their 
14 See Krzysztof Brzechczyn, “Program i myśl polityczna NSZZ ‘Solidarność’,” in 
NSZZ Solidarność 1980–1989, ed. Łukasz Kamiński and Grzegorz Waligóra (Warsaw: 
IPN, 2010), 2: 49–58.
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opponents from other underground structures) had a major positive impact 
on the ways the underground developed. The existence of a political centrum 
was important as a symbol, but it did not generate effective ideas for action. 
The practice demonstrated that protests which had been planned top-down 
did not always work. An example of this was the less-than-expected turnout 
at the November 10, 1982 demonstrations called for by the TKK.15 Whether 
it would have been possible to come up with something more effective is a 
different matter.
Alternatively, mid-level leaders had a much greater impact on the func-
tioning of the underground. The structure, functionality, and resilience of un-
derground units and organizations depended on their industriousness and 
inventiveness. Even if the underground developed countrywide structures, 
and individual cells acknowledged some organizational unity with the cen-
trum, they remained largely autonomous. Also, much depended upon local 
circumstances. If we compare the conditions for opposition activities in War-
saw with even the most active provincial centers, we see they differed radi-
cally. Dense networks of various dissident initiatives existed in some places, 
while in others there were scattered groups of activists, and still in others there 
were isolated ephemeral actions. In symbolic terms the Polish opposition was 
undoubtedly a single large movement, but in terms of its organization and 
activities in various places, it varied significantly. This in turn impacted the 
locally declared objectives and repertoires of contention. 
The Significance and the Weakness of the Publishing Underground in 
the 1980s 
Despite the introduction of martial law in 1981, there was still a relatively 
widespread opposition movement in Poland. Its repertoire on contention in-
cluded diverse legal and semi-legal activities as well as what we summar-
ily call the Solidarność underground. The delineation between these spheres 
was rather tenuous, as often the same people driven by the same motivations 
participated in more than one of them. The character of these activities was 
diverse depending upon local conditions and the needs of the community. In 
some circles the opposition self-organized around books, in others around the 
patriotic masses—while also attending unofficial exhibits and film screenings, 
or participating in street demonstrations.
15 See A. Friszke, “Tymczasowa Komisja Koordynacyjna NSZZ ‘Solidarność’ (1982–
1987),” in Solidarność podziemna 1981–1989, ed. A. Friszke (Warsaw: ISP PAN 2006), 
41–51.
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Regardless of the diversity of locally created patterns of opposition activi-
ties, it seems the underground was of principal importance to the movement. 
The underground was the only part capable to formulate the movement’s de-
mands directly and openly display its prohibited symbols. Publishing was by 
all means the most important activity of the underground; it had the qualities 
of continuity and permanency, and its products were accessible to all partici-
pants of the movement. An underground book or journal was for many years 
tangible proof that illegal Solidarność was alive and active. Its networks of 
production and distribution sustained the networks of collaboration in society 
at large and maintained a certain level of its mobilization.
At the same time, at least starting in the mid-1980s the publishing move-
ment found itself in a serious crisis. It remained a significant social phenome-
non, but it was increasingly clear that it was not a method of overcoming the 
system. Underground publishing no longer harmed the logic of the system 
which was redefined after December 13, 1981, and which was resigned to the 
fact that the opposition existed openly and communist power had to be based, 
at least partially, on open coercion. Independent publishing was an important 
instrument in providing the sense of continuity of the opposition’s struggle, 
but it lost its offensive character. Despite wide reach and increased produc-
tion of publishing houses, social demobilization progressed in Poland; among 
other things the shrinking pool of activists was a symptom of this erosion. 
While before independent publishing had been linked to a clearly grow-
ing impact of the opposition, during martial law a stagnation occurred. In the 
1970s uncensored publications were a novelty for the broad audience, tangi-
ble proof of emerging organized opposition that had not existed before. They 
offered the possibility to learn what that the opposition had to say. Around 
them a certain habit of reading developed in the circles of the intelligentsia; 
being connected with the opposition gradually became fashionable. During 
the period of legal Solidarność, alongside semi-legal union publications, un-
derground production was the principal medium of the great cognitive break-
through (as already mentioned, the boundary between the legal and the illegal 
was tenuous). Independent publications were a vehicle for much of the hith-
erto inaccessible information, and especially for the new interpretative frame-
work offered by the movement. These factors contributed to the movement’s 
appeal.
During martial law, especially in its initial period, these functions were of 
course still important. It was necessary to communicate to the public that the 
opposition had survived the catastrophe of December 13, 1981, as well as to 
formulate its position, or positions. The fulfillment of these tasks by the pub-
lishing movement meant that that, despite repressions, the opposition move-
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ment retained its shared identity and remained a significant social force. The 
publishing underground “utilized” and “preserved” most of the opposition 
human resources, people who, having been mobilized by the emergence of 
Solidarność, now were actively ready to resist the communists. The new cul-
tural model of the opposition activist was related to the involvement in inde-
pendent publishing that was a kind of showcase for the opposition.  
Furthermore, in the conditions marked by terror, the opposition pushed 
underground was not an attractive proposition for the broad public, even if 
the events of the early 1980s had largely de-legitimized the existing system 
and its leaders. This public was a willing consumer of the opposition’s pro-
duction such as independent publications, but it was not eager to get directly 
involved. Also the fact that this production was of a largely intellectual char-
acter did not help its appeal. At this new stage the Solidarność opposition 
could no longer offer attractive prospects that would offset the risk involved 
in actively joining the movement.16
The publishing underground followed certain models of opposition be-
havior well rooted in the traditions both old and newly generated. At the same 
time publishers looked for innovations that would increase their appeal—for 
instance, by publishing books not related to politics, or investing in graphi-
cally attractive covers, or producing popular underground ephemera like cal-
endars, stamps, or postcards. As a result the repertoires of contention offered 
by them met the social need to demonstrate opposition to the intolerable sys-
tem and retain links to the rebellious community.
However, the number of people willing to play the traditionally positive 
character of a conspirator in the age-long scenario of the national struggle for 
independence decreased. During the years of the 1980s’ “normalization,” the 
activists were discouraged by the futility of their conspiratorial work. Tons of 
paper printed with underground literature seemed to have no effect on the 
balance between the opposition and the authorities. Interest in the opposition 
and its publications diminished, and the underground experienced attrition 
in personnel. In particular it no longer attracted young activists who, during 
legal Solidarność, had not been of age. This was not just a result of effective 
counteractions by the authorities, but also the inability to propose activities 
genuinely affecting the regime. 
16 About ten percent of adult Poles claimed regular or nearly regular access to inde-
pendent publications from the time of martial law and later in the 1980s. If we include 
those who had access “from time to time,” this number increases to about twenty 
percent. See Adam Mielczarek, “Raz jeszcze o sondażowych szacunkach zasięgu wy-
dawnictw podziemnych lat osiemdziesiątych,” Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość 23, no. 1 (2014). 
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When martial law was officially lifted in 1983, the publishing movement 
was obviously stronger than ever before. But in subsequent years it weakened, 
and this was a part of the dwindling of the entire underground. The political 
leaders did not have sound ideas for continuation. They were interested in 
maintaining the level of social support and mobilization, but they could offer 
very little in terms of immediate gratification or a prospect of success that 
would rationally balance the costs paid by the activists. Thus the survival of 
the movement can be attributed more to the inertia and the particular model of 
patriotism rooted in the Polish romantic tradition of sacrifice and martyrdom 
than to logical calculations of the movement’s participants. 
This weakness also translated into what they managed to gain later, 
during the transition. The underground certainly greatly contributed to the 
preservation of favorable attitudes towards the opposition in society at large, 
in particular by keeping the political leaders recognizable and credible. Yet, at 
the time of the 1989 breakthrough, the underground was not a political power. 
The power was in the hands of the politicians at the Round Table. And even 
if they once again used underground structures to organize the elections, and 
gave the underground leaders hope of acquiring more influence through the 
Citizens’ Committees, in the long run they were not interested that the struc-
tures of the existing social movement played a significant role in transforming 
the system.
It is also important to note that independent periodicals did not survive 
the transition of 1989. In many local centers the editors tried to change into 
legal publishers of the Citizens’ Committees’ bulletins or union publications. 
These initiatives lacked professional resources and were unable to compete 
with local Party press repainted into democratic colors on the one hand, and 
Gazeta Wyborcza on the other. Former managers of the social movement now 
coming to power had no intention of supporting their colleagues from the 
underground; they were interested in suppressing grassroots activity rather 
than strengthening it. In the adopted transition model, grassroots activity of 
a social movement was not a rational choice. So the worn-out activists took 
the symbolic political breakthrough as a good excuse to withdraw from their 
activities. 
Conclusion
The development of the Polish opposition as a social movement and publish-
ing, which was an especially important part of the movement, were influenced 
both by the mechanisms of grassroots mobilization and the decisions of politi-
cal leaders who tried to direct this movement. But the principal factor was the 
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rebellious energy of the rank-and-file activists looking for opportunities to be-
come politically involved. Each was a kind of manager at his or her particular 
level of the organization’s structure, making decisions about how much effort 
to put into it and calculating whether the possible gratification was worth the 
risk. 
This was largely due to the fact that the movement had no good ratio-
nal road map leading to a predictable victory. The involvement itself offered 
activists some rewards like prestige or a sense of being a part of the Polish 
patriotic tradition, and a satisfaction with immediate accomplishments, but 
these benefits were relatively weak compared to the actual dangers. Hence the 
movement was difficult to direct by its potential political leaders who de facto 
did not have the resources to provide the activists with adequate rewards. 
That publishing was the main current within the opposition in Poland was 
a coincidence of several factors: the authorities’ relative tolerance towards this 
kind of activity, preexisting cultural models, resources and skills developed 
over time, and finally a tradition created by the movement itself. Even if the 
underground printing movement played a great role as an instrument of so-
cial mobilization during the whole period of the social conflict in the 1980s, it 
did not evolve into a real political power at the collapse of communism. This 
was because the mechanism of the great change was different; ultimately, it 
was not a result of social pressure but political decisions. The dynamic of that 
change was that of top-down modifications for which the ongoing power of 
the social movement could have been more than just a threat.
